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Abstract 21 
The aim of the current study was to explore the influence that the age, and the familiarity, of 22 
a group majority has upon copying fidelity in 4- to 6-year-old children. In Experiment 1 23 
participants (N = 120, M age = 68 months) viewed 5 child models, all of whom were either 24 
younger, the same age, or older than themselves open a puzzle box using an inefficient (4 25 
models), or an efficient technique (1 model). In Experiment 2 (N = 82, M age = 71 months) 26 
the identical task was presented by groups of unfamiliar models. In both Experiments 1 and 2 27 
a group of control participants saw an equal number of inefficient and efficient models. 28 
Results showed that the participants displayed conformity irrespective of the age, or the 29 
familiarity, of the individuals comprising the majority. However, the participants varied in 30 
their level of imitative fidelity depending on the identity of the group majority, with 31 
majorities that were either the same age, or considerably older, than the participants eliciting 32 
the highest levels of over-imitation. In contrast groups comprising individuals who were 33 
younger than the participants elicited a significantly lower level of over-imitation to that 34 
elicited by the same aged and older majorities. We suggest that these findings demonstrate an 35 
interplay between conformist and model-based transmission biases. 36 
 37 
 38 
 39 
 40 
 41 
 42 
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Introduction  43 
If we were to glance around our everyday environments, we would likely see ample evidence 44 
of the human disposition to adopt the behaviors and attitudes of those surrounding them. This 45 
conformist tendency was demonstrated experimentally by Solomon Asch in the 1950’s where 46 
a substantial proportion of adult participants were shown to agree with a majority response in 47 
a perceptual judgment task despite the majority view being clearly incorrect (Asch, 1955; 48 
1956). This bias to conform- here defined as the propensity to display a behavior as it is the 49 
most frequent displayed in others (Claidière & Whiten, 2012)- seems somewhat surprising as 50 
it would appear to have the potential to lead individuals, at least on some occasions, to adopt 51 
ineffectual responses. However, evolutionary biologists have shown that rather than 52 
conformity being a limitation of our species, our bias towards conformity most likely serves 53 
key social functions by promoting ingroup cohesion and defining ingroup/outgroup 54 
boundaries (Boyd & Richerson, 1988; 2009; Henrich & Boyd, 1998). The potential 55 
importance of conformity, both theoretically and behaviorally, has led to recent explorations 56 
of the phylogenetic (Haun, Rekers, & Tomasello, 2012), and ontogenetic roots of this 57 
conformist disposition (Corriveau & Harris, 2010; Haun & Tomasello, 2011). 58 
Studies that have adapted the Asch paradigm for use with preschool children have 59 
shown that 3/4-year-old children conform at similar levels to their adult counterparts when 60 
faced with a majority (of adults or peers) making an incorrect perceptual judgement  61 
(Corriveau & Harris, 2010; Haun & Tomasello, 2011). Similarly, studies from the trust in 62 
testimony literature have shown children’s readiness to conform to the label used by the 63 
majority even when this label is incorrect (Chen, Corriveau, & Harris, 2012; Fusaro & Harris, 64 
2008, 2013; Seston & Kelemen, 2013). More recently, the study of conformity within the 65 
preschool period has been extended to the domain of action copying, with studies asking 66 
whether individuals will copy the actions displayed by a majority over an alternative action 67 
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displayed by a minority. In one such study 2-year-old humans, orangutans and chimpanzees 68 
were allowed to observe a majority of same species models each place a ball in the same 69 
container (from a choice of three), whilst a single individual (the minority) was seen to place 70 
their ball in a different container (Haun, Rekers & Tomasello, 2012). The results showed that 71 
two of the three species were influenced by the majority, with 56% of the children and 72% 72 
of the chimpanzees placing their ball in the same container as the majority despite there being 73 
no rationale for doing so. The orangutans by contrast responded randomly. Conformity to the 74 
actions displayed by the majority has also been demonstrated in slightly older children, with 75 
3- to 6-year-olds more readily performing the technique used to remove pegs from a 76 
pegboard by two models, than the same technique performed by a single model (Herrmann, 77 
Legare, Harris, & Whitehouse, 2013). 78 
That the children in the studies described above readily adopted the same actions as 79 
the majority suggests that the domain of action copying may provide a fruitful, and as of yet 80 
relatively untapped, avenue with which to explore conformist behavior. Traditional action 81 
copying (social learning) studies are most often dyadic (one model and one observer), and 82 
precise fidelity to the task is assessed using a two-action design where half of the participants 83 
see a single model operate an object using technique A, with the remaining half viewing a 84 
single model operate the same object using an equally effective technique B (e.g., Whiten, 85 
Custance, Gomez, Teixidor, & Bard, 1996).  Studies have shown that children frequently 86 
copy the technique witnessed with high levels of fidelity (e.g., Hopper, Lambeth, Schapiro & 87 
Whiten, 2008; Whiten et al., 1996), however we currently know little of how children will 88 
respond when viewing a group of models, the majority of whom perform a task using a 89 
different technique to a minority. Will children conform to the technique performed by the 90 
majority even if there is no need to do so in order to succeed in the task? A tentative answer 91 
to this question can be extrapolated from the findings of recent studies that have used an open 92 
5 
 
diffusion approach to explore the cultural transmission of tool use in preschool children 93 
(Flynn & Whiten, 2012; Whiten & Flynn, 2010). In these open diffusion studies an individual 94 
who was pre-trained to retrieve a reward from inside a puzzle box, using one of two different, 95 
but equally effective, techniques, was allowed to perform the task within their naïve peer 96 
group. Typically, the technique seeded spread, with the majority of individuals adopting the 97 
technique performed by the pre-trained individual, providing suggestive evidence that 98 
preschool children will conform to the most common behavioral variant witnessed. More 99 
recent studies that have provided a more direct test of conformity in the context of action 100 
copying have shown that children prefer to copy the actions used by a majority (of adult 101 
models) than a minority when both solutions are equally successful (Wilks, Collier-Baker, & 102 
Nielsen, 2015). A majority preference that occurs independently of emotional reactions to the 103 
behavior (Turner, Nielsen, Collier-Baker, 2014). The preference to copy to an adult majority 104 
has also been demonstrated in the context of tool selection, where children frequently 105 
selected the same inefficient tool chosen by an adult majority rather than an efficient tool 106 
chosen by a minority (DiYanni, Corriveau, Kurkul, Nasrini, & Nini, 2015).  107 
The current study aimed to build on previous conformity studies by detailing not only 108 
whether the behavior of the majority influences the propensity of 4- to 6-year-old children to 109 
conform, but also asks for the first time whether the age of the group majority relative to the 110 
observer impacts on this tendency. Previous studies have used either adult models or same 111 
aged peers, thus we know little of the relative influence that individuals of different ages have 112 
on conformist behavior. This leaves open the question of whether some individuals who are 113 
present in an observer’s day-to-day environment have a greater influence on copying 114 
behavior than others. The task used was the Glass Ceiling Box, first designed for use in a 115 
comparative project (Horner & Whiten; 2005), and subsequently adopted by many 116 
researchers to explore what has become known as ‘over-imitation’, or ‘over-copying’ in both 117 
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the preschool period and beyond (e.g., Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris, & Keil, 2011; Lyons, 118 
Young, & Keil, 2007; McGuigan, Gladstone, & Cook, 2012; McGuigan, 2012; 2013; 119 
Moraru, Gomez, & McGuigan, 2016; Nielsen & Blank, 2011). In contrast to the traditional 120 
two-action design tasks described above, where the model operates the task using only 121 
actions that are causally necessary (e.g., removing an obstruction to obtain a reward), the 122 
Glass Ceiling Box is modelled using actions that are both causally unnecessary (the lack of 123 
causality is evident as the box is transparent) and causally necessary to retrieve a reward. 124 
Modelling the task in this way allows observers to approach the task efficiently by retrieving 125 
the reward by opening a small door on the front face of a box and inserting a stick tool inside 126 
(the efficient task variant). Alternatively observers could over-imitate by performing a 127 
number of causally irrelevant actions on the top of the box (e.g., tapping the box with the 128 
tool) before reward retrieval occurs (the inefficient task variant).  129 
The majority of the previous studies that have used the Glass Ceiling Box have 130 
utilized a single adult model who always demonstrated the task inefficiently (e.g., McGuigan 131 
& Whiten, 2009; McGuigan,Whiten, Flynn & Horner, 2007; Whiten, Allan, Devlin, Kseib, 132 
Raw, & McGuigan, 2016). Typically children in the age period 3-5 years over-imitate by 133 
copying the causally irrelevant actions performed by the adult model with extremely high 134 
levels of fidelity (e.g., Lyons et al., 2007; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). The high levels of 135 
over-imitation witnessed following task demonstration by an adult model contrast with the 136 
findings of studies that have shown that a child model tends to elicit much lower levels of 137 
irrelevant action fidelity (Flynn, 2008; McGuigan & Graham, 2010; McGuigan, Makinson, & 138 
Whiten, 2011; Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2012). However, the results of a recent study suggest 139 
that task demonstration by multiple inefficient peers can lead to increased levels of over-140 
imitation (McGuigan & Robertson, 2015). McGuigan and Robertson (2015) asked whether 4-141 
year-old children would switch from their initially efficient approach to the task if the number 142 
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of inefficient models were incrementally increased. In an initial phase the children saw two 143 
familiar peers perform the task, one efficiently and one inefficiently, before one of the models 144 
left the testing room leaving the participant to perform the task in the presence of the 145 
remaining model. The results showed that the children always performed the task efficiently 146 
irrespective of which model was present during their reproduction. However, in a second 147 
phase of the study the same participants became increasingly likely to include the irrelevant 148 
actions in their reproductions as the number of familiar peers performing the task 149 
inefficiently increased (from 1 to 4 inefficient individuals). The highest levels of over-150 
imitation were witnessed after viewing a 4:1 ratio of inefficient to efficient models, although 151 
even a small inefficient majority (2:1) was enough to significantly increase the levels of over-152 
imitation witnessed after viewing one efficient and one inefficient model at baseline. 153 
Intriguingly, in a final phase of the study where the task was presented to the children outside 154 
of the experimental context the level of over-imitation reduced dramatically suggesting that 155 
the participants’ causal understanding of the task remained intact, and that social influences 156 
lay behind their tendency to over-imitate. 157 
The paradigm used by McGuigan and Robertson (2015) was adapted in the current 158 
study in order to determine whether the levels of over-imitation witnessed would vary 159 
according to the age of the models comprising the group majority. In McGuigan and 160 
Robertson (2015), the group majority comprised familiar individuals who were the same age 161 
as the observers, leaving open the question of whether or models who are either younger, or 162 
older, than the participants would elicit varying levels of over-imitation. Previous dyadic 163 
studies (e.g., Koenig & Harris, 2005; Koenig, Clèment, & Harris, 2004) have pointed to the 164 
existence of age related copying biases (e.g., prestige bias; expertise bias), where children 165 
show a preference for learning from older informants, and conversely show a distrust of 166 
information provided by younger informants (i.e., younger individuals are viewed as less 167 
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knowledgeable and less esteemed than older individuals). However, it has yet to be 168 
determined whether these biases are evident outside of dyadic contexts.  169 
In order to explore the influence that the age of the majority has on copying fidelity, 170 
4- to 6-year-old participants in Experiment 1 were presented with task solutions by a group of 171 
five models (4 inefficient models and 1 efficient model) who were either all younger than the 172 
participants, all the same age as the participants, or all older than the participants (as in 173 
McGuigan & Robertson 2015 the models (with the exception of the oldest models) attended 174 
the same elementary school as the participants). In a second experiment, we explored the 175 
influence of model familiarity by presenting the identical task to that used in Experiment 1 to 176 
a second group of participants who were unfamiliar with the models. In both Experiments 1 177 
and 2 we included a further test of conformity by allowing each participant to perform the 178 
task in a ‘post-experiment’ trial in which they were led to believe that the experiment was 179 
complete, thereby removing the social pressure to conform. We predicted that irrespective of 180 
model familiarity the children would be least likely to reproduce the causally irrelevant 181 
actions when faced with an inefficient majority younger than themselves, with the tendency 182 
towards over-imitation increasing as the age of the models comprising the group majority 183 
increased. 184 
 185 
Experiment 1  186 
Method 187 
Participants 188 
One hundred and twenty participants (60 males and 60 females) who ranged in age 189 
from 54 to 78 months (M = 68 months, SD = 6 months) took part in the study. The children 190 
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were allocated to one of 6 conditions each of which comprised 20 participants. In addition to 191 
the experimental participants the study required the participation of 32 (16 males and 16 192 
females) pre-trained child models who provided the task demonstrations in each condition. 193 
Children were predominantly Caucasian and came from mixed socioeconomic backgrounds. 194 
Informed consent was obtained from a parent or guardian of each child. 195 
 196 
Design 197 
The participants were randomly allocated to one of six conditions in a between 198 
participants design, and their responses videotaped for later analysis. In five ‘inefficient 199 
majority’ conditions the participants viewed a total of five task demonstrations (4 inefficient, 200 
1 efficient) presented by a group of five identically aged models (both male and female) who 201 
were either all younger (3-year-old models), all the same age (5-year-old models), or all older 202 
than the participants (8-year-old models, 11-year-old models or 13-year-old models). 203 
Irrespective of condition, four individuals performed the task inefficiently (the majority), and 204 
one individual performed a single efficient demonstration (the minority) with the gender of 205 
the efficient model, and the order in which the efficient model demonstrated (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th 206 
or 5th) fully counterbalanced.   207 
In a ‘no-majority’ control condition participants viewed two task demonstrations, one 208 
performed by an efficient model and one by an inefficient model (both 5 years of age, one 209 
male and one female), with the gender and the order in which the efficient and inefficient 210 
models demonstrated fully counterbalanced. All of the models were recruited from the same 211 
elementary school (and adjoining Kindergarten class) as the participants with the exception of 212 
the 13-year-old models who had recently attended the same elementary school as the 213 
participants but were now attending a nearby Junior High School. The school environment 214 
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was one that allowed for interaction between the youngest and oldest children on a daily 215 
basis. However, in order to emphasize that the models were attending the participants’ school 216 
(or the nearby Junior High) the models were filmed in full school uniform.  217 
 218 
Apparatus 219 
The apparatus used was a transparent puzzle box (20cm3) that was completely sealed 220 
with the exception of two small openings, one on the top of the box and one on the front face 221 
of the box. Each of the openings was covered by a defence, which comprised a small door in 222 
the case of the front opening, and two bolts in the case of the top opening. The opening on the 223 
front face of the box was connected to an opaque tube that held a reward (a small magnetic 224 
toy). In order to retrieve the reward the participant was required to slide open the door and 225 
insert a tool (22cm long) with a magnetic tip into the tube. In contrast, the reward could not 226 
be retrieved via the opening on top of the box, as a ‘false ceiling’ prevented the tool from 227 
making contact with the tube. Actions directed toward the box could therefore be divided into 228 
two distinct types: causally relevant actions (directed to the front face of the box) and 229 
causally irrelevant actions (directed to the top of the box).  230 
 231 
Procedure 232 
Experimental Phase. On entry to the testing room, the participant was asked to sit at a 233 
table directly facing the puzzle box. The experimenter then told the participant that: ‘There is 234 
a toy inside the box, and I’m going to show you [the participant] a video of some other 235 
children getting the toy out’ (the same toy was extracted from the box by all models). When 236 
the participant appeared comfortable, the box was moved out of direct sight and the video 237 
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was shown via a laptop display. The video comprised five segments, each interspersed with a 238 
blank screen that showed each of the five models performing the task individually. In order to 239 
ensure that the observer’s experience, and subsequent performance, was as naturalistic as 240 
possible the experimenter never explicitly mentioned the age of the models. 241 
In the ‘inefficient-majority’ conditions the participants viewed five different models 242 
retrieve the reward from inside the box. Of these models four (the majority) performed five 243 
causally irrelevant actions using an identical sequence (removing both bolts and tapping on 244 
the internal false ceiling three times) before reward retrieval, whereas one model (the 245 
minority) used only the causally necessary actions required to retrieve the toy (opening the 246 
door and using the tool to retrieve the reward). In the ‘no-majority’ control condition the 247 
video showed two models retrieve the reward from inside the box, one who performed the 248 
same sequence of causally irrelevant actions used in the ‘inefficient majority’ conditions, and 249 
one who used only the causally necessary actions required to retrieve the toy. On completion 250 
of the task demonstrations, the box was placed in front of the participant with the following 251 
instruction: ‘Now it’s your turn’. In order that the presence of the experimenter would have 252 
minimal influence on the participant’s performance the experimenter looked away from the 253 
child during their response period. 254 
 255 
 ‘Post-experiment’ phase. After the experimental phase of the study was complete, 256 
each participant received a ‘post-experimental’ trial in which the experimenter acted as 257 
though the experiment was complete by thanking the participant, and giving them a small 258 
reward for their participation. Once the participant had been thanked for taking part, they 259 
were asked if they could ‘check that the toy is back in the box for the next participant’. This 260 
post-experimental trial was adapted from that used successfully in previous studies (e.g., 261 
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McGuigan et al., 2012; McGuigan et al., 2015), and aimed to determine whether the 262 
participants would continue to perform the causally irrelevant actions outside of the 263 
experimental context. As in the experimental conditions, the experimenter looked away 264 
during the child’s attempt. If the levels of over-imitation were substantially lower in the post-265 
experiment trial, then it is likely that any reproduction of the causally irrelevant actions in the 266 
experimental phase was due to the influence of the inefficient majority rather than reflecting 267 
the participant’s private causal knowledge of the task. 268 
 269 
Scoring  270 
An ‘over-imitation score’ was calculated for each participant by totaling the number 271 
of irrelevant actions that matched those demonstrated by the inefficient model(s) (i.e., 2 bolt 272 
removals and 3 irrelevant tool taps against the false ceiling). The minimum score a 273 
participant could receive was 0 indicating that no causally irrelevant actions were performed, 274 
with a maximum score of 5 indicating that all elements of the inefficient sequence were 275 
reproduced (i.e., the participant performed 2 bolt removals and 3 taps).  276 
 277 
Inter-rater reliability.  278 
The data from 15 children representing 13% of the total sample were coded 279 
independently by a naïve observer. The ratings showed high concordance suggesting that the 280 
coding scheme was highly reliable for the experiment trial (intraclass correlation: r = .97, p < 281 
.001). In the post-experiment trial no intraclass correlations were conducted as the raters 282 
matched exactly. 283 
 284 
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Results 285 
Preliminary analysis. Initial analysis of the data from the five experimental conditions 286 
revealed that the level of over-imitation did not vary according to the position of the efficient 287 
demonstration (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th or 5th), the gender of the observer, or the gender of the efficient 288 
model, nor was there an interaction between observer gender and the gender of the minority 289 
efficient model. Similarly, in the ‘no-majority’ control condition neither the order in which 290 
the efficient model demonstrated (1st or 2nd), or the gender of the efficient model influenced 291 
task fidelity, therefore these factors were excluded from all subsequent analyses. Irrespective 292 
of the condition to which the participants were allocated all of the children successfully 293 
retrieved the reward from inside the box, therefore the reproduction of the efficient actions 294 
are not considered further. 295 
 296 
Experimental phase. Of interest in the analysis was: 1) whether the number of 297 
children omitting all of the irrelevant actions would differ between the ‘inefficient majority’ 298 
conditions and the ‘no-majority’ control condition, 2) whether the irrelevant action sequence 299 
would be reproduced with higher levels of fidelity in the ‘inefficient majority’ conditions 300 
than the ‘no-majority’ control condition, 3) whether the level of over-imitation in the 301 
‘inefficient-majority’ conditions would vary according to model age, and 4) whether over-302 
imitation would be eliminated when the task was presented outside of the experimental 303 
context. 304 
 305 
Influence of the majority 306 
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Omission of the irrelevant actions. In the ‘no-majority’ control condition, where the 307 
children saw two models, one efficient and one inefficient, the majority (12 from 20) of the 308 
children  acted efficiently and performed no irrelevant actions (see Table 1). This pattern of 309 
responding contrasted with the ‘inefficient majority’ conditions, where after viewing a 310 
majority of models performing inefficiently, only very small numbers of children acted 311 
efficiently (see Table 1). A chi-square analysis revealed that the number of children who 312 
acted efficiently varied significantly across conditions (χ² (5) = 26.3, p < .001), with follow 313 
up chi-square comparisons revealing that significantly fewer children acted efficiently in each 314 
of the ‘inefficient majority’ conditions than in the ‘no-majority’ control condition (see Table 315 
1). Taken together these findings suggest that viewing a majority of individuals acting 316 
inefficiently significantly increased the likelihood that children would include at least some 317 
of the irrelevant actions, with an equal number of efficient and inefficient models resulting in 318 
participants omitting the irrelevant actions from their reproductions.   319 
---Table 1 about here--- 320 
Fidelity of irrelevant action reproduction.. In order to determine whether exposure to 321 
a majority of inefficient models influenced the precise level of fidelity with which the 322 
irrelevant action sequence was reproduced the participants over-imitation scores were 323 
analyzed using a univariate ANOVA with condition (no-majority or majority: 3-, 5-, 8-, 11- 324 
or 13-year-old models) as a between participants factor. The ANOVA revealed a significant 325 
main effect of condition (F(5,114) = 10.02, p < .001, µ = .31) with the post hoc Tukey LSD 326 
tests revealing that the inefficient majority had a powerful effect on behavior with the 327 
children in each of the ‘inefficient majority’ conditions performing significantly more 328 
irrelevant actions than the children in the ‘no-majority’ control condition (p < .001 for each 329 
model group). It appeared that the extent to which the majority influenced the level of over-330 
imitation was influenced by the age of the models, with the post hoc tests revealing that 331 
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significantly less over-imitation occurred following task demonstration by the youngest 332 
models (mean = 2.8) than either the same aged models (mean = 4.05, p = .02), or the oldest 333 
models (mean = 4.05, p = .02) who were copied with equally high levels of fidelity (see Fig. 334 
1). No other condition comparisons were significant. A detailed breakdown of the specific 335 
irrelevant actions performed (by bolt removals and irrelevant taps) in each condition is 336 
provided in SI Table 1. 337 
---Fig 1. About here--- 338 
‘Post-experiment’ comparisons.  339 
Of additional interest was whether the participants would continue to over-imitate outside of 340 
the experimental context when all social pressure to adopt the behavior of the majority was 341 
removed. A series of planned comparisons on the data from each condition revealed that the 342 
number of irrelevant actions performed in the post-experiment trial was substantially reduced 343 
from that witnessed in the experimental trial of each ‘inefficient-majority’ condition (3-year-344 
old models, t(19) = 5.78, p  < .001; 5-year-old models, t(19) = 9.02, p < .001; 8-year-old 345 
models, t(19) = 5.42, p < .001; 11-year-old models, t(19) = 7.89, p < .001; 13-year-old 346 
models, t(19) = 10.16, p < .001), as well as from that witnessed in the ‘no-majority’ control 347 
condition (t(19) = 3.0, p = .007; see Table 2). These findings suggest that the children’s 348 
causal knowledge of the task was unchanged and they performed the causally irrelevant 349 
actions for social reasons. See SI Table 1 for a detailed breakdown of over-imitation by bolt 350 
removals and irrelevant taps in the ‘post-experiment’ trial of each condition. 351 
---Table 2 about here--- 352 
Discussion 353 
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The results from Experiment 1 suggest that the participants did not copy the different 354 
majority groups with equally high levels of fidelity. Instead the children appeared to be 355 
copying selectively, with the same aged and the oldest models eliciting the highest levels of 356 
fidelity. Interestingly, this over-imitative tendency was equally high in response to both the 357 
same aged and the oldest majority groups, and was in each case significantly greater than that 358 
elicited by models who were younger than the participants. A possible explanation for this 359 
pattern of copying fidelity lies in the level of expertise attributed to majorities of each age, 360 
with the youngest children being deemed least expert and therefore less worthy of copying 361 
than the oldest (most expert) children. However, counter to our initial predictions the increase 362 
in over-imitation did not share a linear relationship with increasing model age. Instead the 363 
same aged children, who based on their age alone would have been viewed as one of the least 364 
expert model groups, were copied with equally high levels of fidelity as the oldest children. A 365 
possible explanation for this non-linear relationship may lie in the familiarity of the models. 366 
The models used in Experiment 1 potentially ranged in how familiar they were to the 367 
participants, with the same aged models being the most familiar, the oldest models the least 368 
familiar, and the remaining models of intermediate familiarity. Previous studies have shown 369 
that children prefer to copy individuals who are familiar to them (e.g., Slaughter, Nielsen, & 370 
Enchelmaier, 2008), whilst also showing a preference for copying older expert individuals 371 
(e.g., McGuigan et al., 2011; Wood et al., 2012), suggesting a possible interaction between 372 
familiarity and the age of the model. In order to tease apart the influence of model age and 373 
model familiarity, in a second experiment we presented the videos of the model groups used 374 
in Experiment 1 to groups of participants who were unfamiliar with the models used in the 375 
video clips.  376 
 377 
Experiment 2  378 
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In Experiment 2, we aimed to explore the importance of model age, and model 379 
familiarity, in the conditions where we found the lowest (i.e., 3-year-old models), and highest 380 
(i.e., 5- and 13-year-old models), levels of over-imitation in Experiment 1. If high levels of  381 
familiarity with the same aged models, combined with a sensitivity to model expertise, 382 
explained the pattern of performance witnessed in Experiment 1 then we would predict that 383 
the participants in Experiment 2 would: 1) show a reduction in the level of over-imitation in 384 
response to the now unfamiliar same aged models, and 2) would continue to copy the 385 
youngest and oldest models with the lowest and highest levels of fidelity respectively (albeit 386 
at slightly lower levels than Experiment 1 due to the unfamiliar models). This would generate 387 
a linear pattern of responding with the youngest models being copied least faithfully, the 388 
oldest models most faithfully, with the same age models eliciting a level of over-imitation 389 
intermediate to the younger/older models. If however, model familiarity did not influence the 390 
pattern of over-imitation witnessed in Experiment 1 then we would predict an identical 391 
pattern of responding in Experiment 2 (i.e. equally high levels of over-imitation in the same 392 
aged and oldest models groups combined with a significant reduction in over-imitation in the 393 
youngest model group). 394 
 Experiment 2 also included a new ‘2:2 no-majority’ control condition in which the 395 
participants viewed four models (two efficient; two inefficient), rather than two models (one 396 
efficient; one inefficient) as presented in the ‘no-majority’ condition of Experiment 1. We 397 
included the new 2:2 control condition to rule out the possibility that the participants in the 398 
‘no-majority’ condition of Experiment 1 performed significantly fewer irrelevant actions than 399 
the participants in the ‘inefficient majority’ conditions as the result of viewing only a single 400 
inefficient model. In addition, the inclusion of two inefficient models made the memory 401 
demands more comparable to that witnessed in the ‘inefficient majority’ conditions as the 402 
number of inefficient task demonstrations, and the total number of task demonstrations, were 403 
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more closely equated. It was predicted that the participants would perform very few irrelevant 404 
actions in the ‘2:2 no-majority’ condition, and that the number of irrelevant actions 405 
performed would be substantially reduced to that witnessed in the ‘inefficient majority’ 406 
conditions. 407 
   408 
Method 409 
Participants 410 
 Eighty-two participants (46 males and 36 females) who ranged in age from 56 to 83 411 
months (M  = 71 months, SD = 7 months) took part in the study. The children were allocated 412 
to one of 4 conditions; 3-year-old models (N = 21), 5-year-old models (N = 19), 13-year-old 413 
models (N = 20), or a ‘no-majority’ control (N = 22). The models were those employed in the 414 
same aged, youngest, and oldest model conditions of Experiment 1. In order to ensure that the 415 
models were unfamiliar to the participants all of the children who took part in Exp.2 were 416 
recruited from different schools to that used in Exp. 1.  All children were Caucasian and came 417 
from mixed socioeconomic backgrounds. Informed consent was obtained from a parent or 418 
guardian of each child. An additional 4 children were excluded from the study as they either 419 
failed to interact with the task (n = 3), or due to experimenter error (n = 1). 420 
 421 
Design/Procedure  422 
The participants’ in Experiment 2 were allocated, using a between participants design, 423 
to one of three ‘inefficient majority’ conditions (3-year-old models, 5-year-old models, or 13-424 
year-old models) identical to those presented in Experiment 1. However, in contrast to 425 
Experiment 1 all of the models who were included in Experiment 2 were unfamiliar to the 426 
19 
 
participants. An additional group of participants were allocated to the new ‘2:2 no-majority’ 427 
control condition in which the participants viewed two efficient models and two inefficient 428 
models. To maintain consistency with the 1:1 control condition of Experiment 1, all 4 of the 429 
models (two male and two female) were the same age as the participants (5 years of age) and 430 
were taken from the same pool of 5-year-old models used in Experiment 1. The gender of the 431 
efficient and inefficient models was counterbalanced throughout, and the order in which the 432 
four models demonstrated was fully randomized. The responses of all children were 433 
videotaped for later analysis 434 
 435 
Inter-rater reliability 436 
 The data from 10 children representing 12% of the total sample were coded 437 
independently by a naïve observer. The ratings showed high concordance suggesting that the 438 
coding scheme was highly reliable for the experiment trial (intraclass correlation: r = .97, p < 439 
.001). In the post-experiment trial no intraclass correlations were conducted as the raters 440 
matched exactly. 441 
 442 
Results 443 
Preliminary analysis. Initial analysis of the data from the experimental conditions 444 
revealed that the level of over-imitation did not vary according to the position of the efficient 445 
demonstration (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th or 5th), the gender of the observer, or the gender of the efficient 446 
model, nor was there an interaction between observer gender and the gender of the minority 447 
efficient model. Similarly, in the 2:2 control condition the order in which the efficient and 448 
inefficient models demonstrated, and the gender of the efficient model had no significant 449 
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effect on task fidelity therefore these factors were excluded from all subsequent analyses. 450 
Irrespective of the condition to which the participants were allocated all of the children 451 
successfully retrieved the reward from inside the box, therefore the reproduction of the 452 
efficient actions are not considered further. 453 
 454 
Experimental Phase. Of interest in the analysis was: 1) whether the number of 455 
children omitting all of the irrelevant actions would differ between the ‘inefficient majority’ 456 
conditions and the ‘2:2 no-majority’ control condition, 2) whether the irrelevant action 457 
sequence would be reproduced with higher levels of fidelity in the ‘inefficient majority’ 458 
conditions than the ‘2:2 no-majority’ control condition, 3) whether the age of the inefficient 459 
majority influenced the level of over-imitation witnessed, 4) whether the varying degrees of 460 
familiarity with the models in the ‘inefficient-majority’ conditions of Experiments 1 and 2 461 
would influence the level of over-imitation witnessed, 5) whether the inclusion of an 462 
additional inefficient model in the ‘2:2 no-majority’ control would lead to higher levels of 463 
over-imitation than that witnessed in the ‘no-majority’ control condition of Experiment 1, and 464 
6) whether over-imitation would be eliminated when the task was presented outside of the 465 
experimental context. 466 
 467 
Influence of the majority 468 
Omission of the irrelevant actions. In the ‘no-majority’ control condition, where the 469 
children saw four unfamiliar models, two efficient and two inefficient, the majority (16 from 470 
22) of the children acted efficiently and performed no irrelevant actions (see Table 1). As in 471 
Exp. 1 this pattern of responding contrasted with the ‘inefficient majority’ conditions, where 472 
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after viewing a majority of unfamiliar models performing inefficiently, smaller numbers of 473 
children acted efficiently (see Table 1).  A chi-square analysis revealed that the number of 474 
children who acted efficiently varied significantly across conditions (χ² (3) = 20.5, p < .001), 475 
with follow up chi-square comparisons revealing that significantly fewer children acted 476 
efficiently in each of the three ‘inefficient majority’ conditions than in the ‘no-majority’ 477 
control condition (see Table 1). Taken together these findings suggest that viewing only a 478 
single inefficient model could not explain the low levels of over-imitation witnessed in the 479 
‘no-majority’ control condition of Exp. 1. Instead it appears as though viewing a majority of 480 
individuals acting inefficiently, irrespective of their familiarity, results in the observer 481 
reproducing irrelevant actions. 482 
Fidelity of irrelevant action reproduction. In order to determine whether exposure to a 483 
majority of unfamiliar inefficient models influenced the precise level of fidelity with which 484 
the irrelevant action sequence was reproduced the participants over-imitation scores were 485 
analyzed using a univariate ANOVA with condition (no-majority or majority: 3-, 5-, or 13-486 
year-old models) as a between participants factor. The ANOVA revealed a significant main 487 
effect of condition (F(2,78) = 10.28, p < .001, µ = .28), with the post hoc Tukey LSD tests 488 
revealing that the inefficient majority had a powerful effect on behavior with the children in 489 
each of the ‘inefficient majority’ conditions performing significantly more irrelevant actions 490 
than the children in the ‘no-majority’ control condition (p = .028 for the 3-year-old models, 491 
and p < .001 for the 8- and 13-year-old models; see Fig. 2). It appeared that the extent to 492 
which the majority influenced the level of over-imitation was influenced by the age of the 493 
models, with the post hoc Tukey LSD tests revealing that significantly less over-imitation 494 
occurred following task demonstration by the youngest models (M = 2.0) than the oldest 495 
models (M = 3.65, p = .005), with the difference between the same aged (M = 3.05) and 496 
youngest models approaching significance (p =.07; see Fig. 2). No significant difference in 497 
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the level of over-imitation was revealed between the same aged models and the oldest models 498 
(p = .35), with the reproduction of irrelevant actions being relatively high in both groups. See 499 
SI Table 1 for a detailed breakdown of over-imitation by bolt removals and irrelevant taps in 500 
the experimental trial of each ‘inefficient majority’ condition. 501 
---Fig 2. About here--- 502 
Influence of model familiarity.  503 
In order to determine whether model familiarity influenced the occurrence of over-504 
imitation, the number of irrelevant actions performed in each ‘inefficient majority’ condition 505 
of Experiment 2 was directly compared to the equivalent condition of Experiment 1. The 506 
analyses revealed that model familiarity had little influence on imitative fidelity with the 507 
number of irrelevant actions performed in the ‘inefficient majority’ conditions of Experiment 508 
2 not differing significantly from that witnessed in the equivalent condition of Experiment 1 509 
in either the younger model condition (M Exp. 1 = 2.8, M Exp. 2 = 2.0; t(39) = 1.29, p = .20), 510 
or the older model condition (M Exp. 1 = 4.1, M Exp. 2 = 3.7; t(38) = .76, p = .45), although 511 
the analysis of the same aged model condition did reveal a non-significant trend towards 512 
higher fidelity copying of familiar models (M Exp. 1 = 4.1, M Exp. 2 = 3.1; t(37) = 1.76, p = 513 
.09). Similarly, performance in the ‘no-majority’ control conditions did not differ 514 
significantly between experiments (M Exp. 1 = 0.9, M Exp. 2 = 0.7; t(40) = .42, p = .68), 515 
suggesting that neither model familiarity, nor the number of inefficient models witnessed 516 
influenced the performance of the control children.  517 
The lack of difference between the equivalent conditions of Experiments 1 and 2 518 
suggests that model familiarity had little influence within each individual model group. 519 
However, it appeared as though the level of over-imitation was consistently lower across the 520 
unfamiliar model conditions than that witnessed in the familiar model conditions. In order to 521 
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determine whether these differences were significant we collapsed the data from each  522 
condition (3-, 5-, and 13-year-old ‘inefficient majority’ conditions and ‘2:2 no-majority’ 523 
control) of Experiment 2 into an unfamiliar model variable and the equivalent four conditions 524 
of Experiment 1 into an familiar model variable. A univariate ANOVA with familiarity 525 
(familiar or unfamiliar) as a between participants factor revealed that model familiarity 526 
influenced the copying fidelity witnessed with significantly fewer irrelevant actions (F(1,160) 527 
= 3.96, p = .04, µ = .02) being performed across the unfamiliar model conditions (M = 2.3) 528 
than the familiar model conditions (M = 3.0). 529 
 530 
 ‘Post-experiment’ comparisons.  531 
Of additional interest was whether the participants would continue to over-imitate 532 
outside of the experimental context when all social pressure to adopt the behavior of the 533 
majority was removed. A series of planned comparisons on the data from each condition 534 
revealed that the number of irrelevant actions performed in the post-experiment trial was 535 
substantially reduced from that witnessed in the experimental trial of each ‘inefficient-536 
majority’ condition (3-year-old models, t(20) = 4.33, p < .001; 5-year-old models, t(17) = 537 
5.81, p < .001; 13-year-old models, t(19) = 7.89, p < .001; see Table 2), as well as from that 538 
witnessed in the ‘no-majority’ control condition (t(21) = 2.59, p = .017). These findings 539 
suggest that the children’s causal knowledge of the task was unchanged, and they performed 540 
the causally irrelevant actions for social reasons. See SI Table 1 for a detailed breakdown of 541 
over-imitation by bolt removals and irrelevant taps in the ‘post-experiment’ trial of each 542 
condition. 543 
 544 
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Discussion 545 
The results of Experiment 2 show that additional groups of participants over-imitated 546 
at similar levels to those participants in the equivalent ‘inefficient majority’ conditions of 547 
Experiment 1. This suggests that high levels of familiarity with the same aged models, in 548 
combination with a preference for copying older, more expert models, could not account for 549 
the pattern of performance witnessed in Experiment 1. Instead, the consistent level of over-550 
imitation across the equivalent conditions of the two experiments suggests that same aged, 551 
and older models, are particularly powerful in eliciting of copying behavior, whereas younger 552 
models do not elicit as strong an imitative tendency. In contrast to the high levels of over-553 
imitation witnessed in the ‘inefficient majority’ conditions the children in the ‘no-majority’ 554 
control conditions of both experiments performed very few irrelevant actions. The 555 
equivalence between the two control conditions suggests that viewing only a single 556 
inefficient model in the ‘no-majority’ condition of Experiment 1, and therefore differential 557 
memory demands, could not account for the low levels of over-imitation witnessed, instead it 558 
appeared as though presenting an equal number of inefficient and efficient models reduced 559 
the occurrence of over-imitation from the majority conditions irrespective of whether 1 or 2 560 
inefficient models were viewed. 561 
 562 
General Discussion 563 
Taken together the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 show that witnessing task 564 
demonstration by a majority comprised of inefficient models resulted in significantly higher 565 
levels of over-imitation than viewing an equal number of inefficient and efficient models. 566 
However, the extent to which the children in Experiment 1 over-imitated was influenced by 567 
the identity of the models comprising the group majority, with children copying the causally 568 
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irrelevant actions performed by the same aged models, and the oldest models at equally high 569 
levels, a level of copying fidelity that was significantly greater than that elicited by the 570 
youngest models. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the pattern of over-imitation witnessed 571 
across the different majority groups of Experiment 1did not result from model familiarity, 572 
although the inclusion of unfamiliar models depressed the overall level of over-imitation 573 
across groups. Intriguingly, in both experiments the reproduction of causally irrelevant 574 
actions was almost completely eradicated outside of the experimental context, suggesting that 575 
a social motivation may lie behind this conformist tendency. These results integrate the 576 
conformity, action copying, and selective action copying literatures in a novel way, and 577 
provide detailed insights of the influence of the age, and familiarity, of the majority on 578 
children’s behavior within the context of over-imitation. 579 
 The tendency of the children in the current study to adopt the behavior of the majority 580 
is consistent with the findings of previous studies that have shown conformity in the 581 
preschool period (Corriveau & Harris, 2010; Haun et al., 2012; Haun & Tomasello, 2011; 582 
Herrmann et al., 2013). However, the present findings go beyond showing a conformist bias, 583 
to demonstrate that the level of conformity was influenced by the identity of the individuals 584 
comprising the majority, with same aged and much older models eliciting high levels of 585 
copying fidelity, and younger models failing to elicit equivalent levels of matching behavior. 586 
This pattern of performance suggests that whether or not children will conform does not share 587 
a straightforward relationship with the number of models displaying a particular task 588 
solution. Instead, it appears that children take into account characteristics of the individuals 589 
comprising the majority, in this case age, and at a broader level familiarity, before copying 590 
selectively. In many respects the selective over-imitation witnessed with differently aged 591 
models broadly mirrors that of earlier dyadic studies that have shown that children are more 592 
likely to copy the irrelevant actions performed by a single adult model, but not those 593 
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performed by a single child model (Flynn, 2008; McGuigan & Graham, 2010; McGuigan et 594 
al., 2011; Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2013). However, even the youngest majority group in the 595 
current study elicited over-imitation at a much higher rate than the single inefficient child 596 
model in the dyadic studies, suggesting that copying the majority likely serves an adaptive 597 
function (Boyd & Richerson, 1988; Henrich & Boyd, 1998).  598 
As well as the level of over-imitation differing between dyadic and group contexts the 599 
children in the current study failed to perform the irrelevant actions in the post-experiment 600 
trial. Taken together these findings appear to suggest that the participants’ motivations were 601 
social in nature (Užgiris, 1981), perhaps resulting from normative conformity (Campbell & 602 
Fairey, 1989; Claidière & Whiten, 2012; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Tanford & Penrod, 1984), 603 
rather than an alteration in their causal knowledge (see Kenward, Karlsson, & Persson, 2011; 604 
Kenward, 2012; Keupp, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2013 for a more detailed discussion of the role 605 
of normativity in over-imitation). This finding is consistent with the results of previous 606 
conformity studies where children’s public responses (verbal) were more likely to coincide 607 
with the majority than their private responses (pointing) (Haun & Tomasello, 2011). It is also 608 
consistent with the finding that preschool children correctly applied perceptual knowledge to 609 
a practical problem, despite having earlier gone along with the incorrect majority in an 610 
equivalent perceptual judgment task (Corriveau & Harris, 2010). These results suggest that, 611 
similar to adults in the pioneering Asch paradigms, children’s responses to the majority are 612 
fleeting rather than reflecting a permanent change in their knowledge, a process that 613 
Corriveau and Harris (2010) termed “respectful deference”. 614 
The ability of children to selectively switch their approach between the experimental 615 
and non-experimental contexts is consistent with the findings from recent studies that have 616 
shown that children readily act on contextual cues provided by the model(s), both social (e.g., 617 
number of models performing an action), and verbal (e.g., “she always does it this way”), in 618 
27 
 
order to appropriately adopt either an informational (instrumental) or a normative 619 
(conventional) stance when performing the task (Clegg & Legare, 2016; Legare, Wen, 620 
Herrmann & Whitehouse, 2015; Keupp, Bancken, Schillmöller, Rakoczy, & Behne, 2016; 621 
Moraru et al., 2016). This capacity for selective copying has recently been extended to 622 
situations in which the context switches between normative and instrumental (Keupp, Behne, 623 
Zachow, Kasbohm, & Rakoczy, 2015). Underpinning this selective social learning may be 624 
transmission biases, a set of evolved cognitive heuristics that enable social learners to 625 
respond to their environment adaptively (Boyd & Richerson, 2005). Evolutionary theory 626 
suggests that a naïve individual is well served by copying the most prevalent behavior 627 
performed by those around them (Boyd & Richerson, 1988; Henrich & Boyd, 1998). This 628 
‘copy the majority’ approach is useful as the behavior of the majority likely provides 629 
information as to what is the most adaptive behavioral variant in that environment, a 630 
mechanism that Boyd and Richerson (2005) termed a conformist bias. However, as well as 631 
being influenced by the behavior of the majority observers may also be influenced by 632 
characteristics of the models, including similarity, prestige and/or expertise relative to the 633 
observer (Haun, van Leeuwen, & Edelson, 2013). These model-based biases are likely highly 634 
adaptive as they allow individuals to adopt the behaviors utilized by successful individuals, 635 
that by extension might ultimately lead to success for the observer themselves (Boyd & 636 
Richerson, 2005).  637 
A key aim of the current study was to bring together conformist and model based 638 
transmission biases in order to explore the interaction between the two. The results suggest 639 
that these biases may interact, with children demonstrating a general tendency to conform to 640 
the majority behavior, but the extent to which they do so varying according to age of the 641 
individuals comprising the majority, and more broadly model familiarity. Intriguingly, there 642 
was not a straightforward relationship between model age and over-imitation with children 643 
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copying both same aged models, and much older models, with the highest levels of fidelity. It 644 
may be that these model based differences reflect a tendency of children to adopt different 645 
biases depending on the age of the majority, with children copying the same aged majority as 646 
they were most similar to themselves i.e., a similarity bias. In contrast, a preference for the 647 
oldest models, and conversely a lack of preference for the younger models, may have 648 
stemmed from an expertise or a prestige bias (where younger individuals are viewed as less 649 
expert and less prestigious than older individuals). Indeed previous studies have shown that 650 
children in this age period are generally very adept at recognizing expert over inexpert 651 
individuals, and acting on that information, in both the domains of action copying (Scofield, 652 
Gilpin, Pierucci, & Morgan, 2013), and testimony (e.g., Koenig & Harris, 2005; Koenig, 653 
Clément, & Harris, 2004; Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007).  654 
With respect to the familiarity of the models, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that 655 
viewing unfamiliar models depressed the overall levels of over-imitation witnessed across 656 
conditions, but did not change the overall pattern of over-imitation witnessed across the 657 
different model groups. The higher levels of over-imitation following task demonstration by 658 
the familiar models may have resulted from the participants viewing models who were 659 
currently, or had recently, attended the same school as the participants, as an ingroup who 660 
were more similar to themselves, than the unfamiliar (outgroup) models. However, selectivity 661 
based on model familiarity was independent of the age of the majority suggesting that some 662 
level of familiarity with the models at the broadest ingroup level (i.e., the same school), may 663 
have been enough to elicit a stronger bias to conform than an unfamiliar outgroup. Future 664 
studies could usefully explore the way that different transmission biases, both conformist and 665 
model based, interact in order to ascertain the conditions under which conformity will occur. 666 
A further feature of the current study that could be usefully examined in future 667 
research is the influence that the physical presence of the majority has on the subsequent 668 
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behavior of the observer. In the current study, and in the majority of conformity studies 669 
involving child participants, the behavior of the majority was presented via a televised 670 
display, and the models were not present during the participant’s reproduction (e.g., 671 
Corriveau & Harris, 2010; Herrman et al., 2013; McGuigan & Stevenson, 2016). As young 672 
children frequently copy the majority despite such models not being physically present, it 673 
appears that merely viewing the behavior of other individuals is enough to elicit conformist 674 
behavior; direct social appraisal or social pressure is not necessary. The lack of influence of 675 
model presence contrasts with the findings of Nielsen and Blank (2011) who found that 676 
children preferentially copied the technique of a model who remained with them during 677 
testing, rather than the technique used by a model who left the testing area. One possible 678 
reason for these discrepant findings is that Nielsen and Blank (2011) employed adult models 679 
who due to their greater status may lead the children to feel that they ‘should’ copy the adults 680 
approach. Intriguingly, using an almost identical paradigm to that used in the current study 681 
McGuigan et al. (2012) found that adults were equally likely to copy an inefficient majority, 682 
irrespective of whether the majority were present or absent during the participant’s attempt, 683 
suggesting that model presence had little influence on copying fidelity. Taken together, these 684 
results suggest that both children and adults can use the frequency of individuals displaying a 685 
particular task solution as a cue to the behavior that is normative for that particular group. In 686 
addition, it appears as though both children and adults are highly sensitive to the context in 687 
which the task was presented- conforming in the experimental context when the task 688 
presentation was framed as ‘your turn’, and omitting the irrelevant actions post experiment. It 689 
is likely that ‘having a turn’ directly after viewing the performance of a group engenders a 690 
sense of normativity missing in the post experiment presentation. Future studies could 691 
usefully explore how sensitive children are to such contextual differences, asking under what 692 
conditions children will conform to the majority behavior. 693 
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In sum, the current study provides unique insights into the study of conformist 694 
behavior in the relatively unexplored area of action copying by showing that, not only were 695 
our young children highly conformist, the extent to which children conformed varied 696 
according to the identity of the individuals comprising the majority, with same aged and 697 
much older models eliciting precise matching, a tendency that was significantly greater than 698 
that elicited by models younger than the participants. The familiarity of the models did not 699 
influence the overall pattern of copying witnessed, but did reduce the overall level of copying 700 
fidelity across conditions. These findings suggest that the interplay between conformist 701 
transmission and model-based biases is complex, but is likely a powerful force behind human 702 
cultural learning. 703 
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